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Crossing the Constitutional Line in Spending
From Persuasion to Compulsion:
A Reply to Gillian Metzger
by David G. Oedel
In her remarks at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Law Schools (AALS), 3 o Professor Gillian Metzger of Columbia University Law School offered an interesting critique of the Spending
Clause"a' claim now being pursued by a majority of the states in the
United States in the constitutional challenge to health care reform."'
The states claim that the changes to Medicaid are beyond the power of
Congress to effect constitutionally under the Spending Clause of the
United States Constitution because the changes are coercive and also
violate the "general restrictions" identified by the Supreme Court of the
United States in South Dakota v. Dole. 3 3
Professor Metzger's overriding point that the Spending Clause claim
will be a "very hard sell" has subsequently been borne out by Judge
Roger Vinson. Though holding the individual mandate to be unconstitutional, Judge Vinson also ruled against the states' Spending Clause

claim in Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Department of Health & Human
January 31, 2011.a13
When Professor Metzger made
Services 13on
her remarks on January 7, 2011, days before Judge Vinson's decision
(the first decision on the merits of that claim by any court hearing a

130. See Our Pending National Debate: Is Health Care Reform Constitutional, 62
MERCER L. REV. 633 (2011).
131. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
132. See Floridaex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *1 & n.1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). The twenty-six states
collectively suing the federal government over health care reform are Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. Their
co-plaintiffs include two individuals and the National Federation of Independent Business.
Id. at *1. The twenty states that had been litigating the case in 2010 prior to the
November 2010 elections were joined in January 2011 by Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Ohio,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1127 & n.1 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (noting the twenty original
plaintiffs).
133.

483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).

134. No. 3:10-cv-91-RVIEMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
135. Id. at *7, *33. Judge Vinson's order granting summary judgment, like many of
the court papers in the most prominent challenges to health care reform, is conveniently
collected on the ACA Litigation Blog, at http://acalitigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Dis
trict+Court+fmal+opinion.pdf.
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challenge to health care reform), she correctly predicted the general
outcome of the first judicial review of the states' Spending Clause claim.
Professor Metzger argued that the coercion claim is undermined
factually to the extent the costs of Medicaid's changes will be disproportionately shouldered by the federal government, not the states.
Professor Metzger also suggested that the final design of health care
reform reflected compromises that in some ways acceded to state
interests and federalism, even if the states were not at the table. As to
the latter point, however, she did not articulate specifically how health
care reform acceded to state interests-perhaps because, with twenty-six
states suing in this action alone, that is a tough case to make.
On more legal-analytical grounds, Professor Metzger observed that "it
is very difficult to come up with a judicially manageable standard for
when changes to a spending program go too far and become coercive."'
According to Professor Metzger, courts have so far declined
to find any conditional federal spending to be coercive (whether in
earlier challenges to prior changes to Medicaid or in other settings)
because of that line-drawing difficulty.
The Spending Clause claim will presumably soon be the subject of an
appellate review of Judge Vinson's decision in Bondi, in which twentysix states lodged and joined. Those states will offer their own arguments
after appeals are filed, as will the federal government. However, writing
on February 28, 2011, only as a constitutional law scholar replying to
Professor Metzger, not as counsel to Georgia in the litigation or as a
commenter on Judge Vinson's own decision, the Author will briefly
sketch some personal reactions to Professor Metzger's specific arguments
offered at the AALS 2011 annual meeting.
Professor Metzger is undoubtedly right that reasonable doubt shrouds
the precise potential extent of federal raiding of the state fiscs under
health care reform. She is also right that, whatever the degree of the
statutorily preordained raiding of state fiscs (modest by Professor
Metzger's predictions and standards), any raiding will inevitably hurt
one state more than another. Some states may even view those raids to
be sufferable in light of countervailing benefits.
Nonetheless, such questions are largely irrelevant to a determination
of whether federal coercion of some states is occurring. One can detect
the tangential, off-the-mark character of Professor Metzger's argument
by recalling that it is no defense to a charge of theft that the accused
stole only a little from a particular victim; a particular victim could
afford to be robbed; the thief could have taken more; the thief was
136. See Gillian Metzger, Defense of the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 62
MERCER L. REV. 633, 637 (2011).

2011]1

OUR PENDING NATIONAL DEBATE

641

planning to be generous with the proceeds of the theft; multiple victims
may have had different circumstances both before and after the
victimization; the victim might have gotten some side benefits from the
victimization; or one "partner" may have consented to an intimate
relationship, while another "partner" may not have consented to the
same sort of relationship (with radically different legal results).
Coercion is the compulsion of another to engage in something against
that other's will, with the effect, in this constitutional setting (at least
according to Justice Benjamin Cardozo), of "destroying or impairing the
autonomy of the states."3 7 The more targeted question, therefore,
unlike Professor Metzger's question about whether the particular
coercion is factually significant when even bigger things may be at stake,
is whether the federal government's changes to Medicaid have been
forced upon these complaining states against their respective wills,
leaving their autonomy impaired or destroyed.
These states claim that their respective wills lie trampled and
impaired, yet even now the states defy the congressional act. Do they
have a factually supportable claim? The fact that some states have
seriously explored the possibility of opting out of the changes to
Medicaid, but not a single state can see how it can responsibly opt out,
suggests that the expansion of Medicaid is coercive. The fact that 100%
of the states are compliant (because the states view it as such a fine
program, according to President Barack Obama's Administration's
strained characterization),' while more than 50% of that identical
population of states is suing to stop the expansion, strongly suggests the
presence of unconstitutional coercion. Another indication of strident
state dissent is the fact that the majority of states are seeking waivers
from the federal government concerning Medicaid's expansions and cost
burdens to the states after the passage of Medicaid "reform," while the
Obama Administration's Department of Health and Human Services is
questioning its own legal authority to grant waivers."9
To reiterate, because coercion is not a question of potentially modest
or incidental future effects but instead a question of present compulsion,140 the courts need to weigh the factual evidence of whether states

137. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937).
138. See Health Reform in Action, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/healthreform (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
139. Sara Murray, et al., Governors Scramble to Rein in Medicaid, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2 2
16
28, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044303045761708420 6 86 6.html ("More than half the states want permission to remove ... people from the Medicaid
insurance program.

...

[T]he Obama Administration . . . says it may lack the authority

to allow such cuts.").
140. See Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 586.
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today have any meaningful choice to opt out of Medicaid's expansion
when all fifty states are capitulating, yet more than twenty-six of the
states are suing to stop the expansion.14 ' That stark juxtaposition by
itself strongly suggests that there is, as a factual matter, no meaningful
choice for the complaining states. Furthermore, the juxtaposition
suggests the presence of compulsion in an indirect form of the death
penalty for citizens of those states that would have the temerity to opt
out. The Obama Administration has insisted repeatedly in the Florida
litigation that Medicaid clearly and unambiguously requires that no
federal funding will be offered for the poor and sick of any state opting
out of the changes.' 42
As to Professor Metzger's legal-analytical objection that there is no
judicially manageable standard for distinguishing between coercive
spending and other constitutionally acceptable forms of spending,
Professor Metzger has at least one very strong point: No court has so far
made such a ruling. This suggests that there exists a longstanding
native judicial caution in the area of constitutional limits on the
spending power. However, courts are generally accomplished at linedrawing-for instance, in distinguishing between unconstitutional
conditions imposed by states in connection with things like public
employment,"' unemployment benefits," and land use."' Courts are
quite capable of drawing such lines in other settings as well-for
example, allowing duress to negate a conclusion of guilt in criminal cases
despite the existence of mens rea (as in criminal law);' distinguishing
between commandeering instead of providing real options for state
legislatures and executive officers (as in Tenth Amendment"' jurisprudence); 14 8 and judging the difference between duress and hard bargaining
(as in classic contractual analysis).'4' There seems to be nothing
categorically different about line-drawing in this setting of the spending
power than in many other parallel legal settings.

141. See Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *1 n.1.
142. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, McCollum,
716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (No. 3:10-cv-91-RVIEMT), 2010 WL 2663348 at *20-22.
143. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
144. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963).
145. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-36 (1987).
146. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 7 (2006).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
148. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161-62 (1992) (commandeering
of state legislature); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904-05 (1997) (commandeering
of local law enforcement officers).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 300-03 (1942).
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In fact, the federal government has itself firmly pressed the notion
that duress involving the federal government is an appropriate subject
for the Supreme Court to judge. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,1so the federal government urged the Court to weigh the federal
government's own claim that it had been subjected to contractual duress
in shipbuilding contracts with Bethlehem Steel entered into long before
the First World War."51 That case lies in fascinating juxtaposition to the
present case of the expanded Medicaid "partnership" between the federal
government and the states. In Bethlehem Steel, the Supreme Court
rejected, on its face, the federal government's factual claim that it was
coerced by a single corporation much smaller than the federal government itself (somewhere between a sixth and a quarter of the federal
government's financial might).1 52 Conversely, a court today might well
take judicial notice that the federal government has exercised its relative
muscle to coerce individual states, which on average have far less the
financial size of the federal government (and even less in terms of
practical might, as the states cannot engage in deficit-spending), into
accepting the Medicaid expansion.
The factual financial-power disparities today between the individual
states and the federal government far outstrip the disparities that gave
rise to the federal government's claim of duress and coercion in
Bethlehem Steel. During World War I (the time of the federal government's ship-building contracts in Bethlehem Steel),"' Bethlehem Steel
was considerably more financially mighty than the typical state today,
as gauged by the relative size and power of such a counter-party or
"partner" compared to the federal government at the respective
times-Bethlehem Steel had revenue of $2.96 million in 1917,154 which
was 15% of the total budgeted spending of the federal government
during that war year and 27% of the budgeted tax receipts for the
federal government that same year ($1.10 billion).155
In stark contrast, in 2010, during another period of national financial
exigency involving a great recession and two wars, the total budgeted
spending of the federal government was $3.55 trillion, and its revenues

150. 315 U.S. 289 (1942).
151. Id. at 294-95.
152.

Id. at 301.

153. Id. at 292.
154. Bethlehem Earnings: Gross Sales for 1917 Reach Total of $296,000,000, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 1918, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdfres=F-

70617 FD3B5B11738DDDA90B94D9405B888DF1D3.
155.

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL

TABLES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 21 (2011), availableat

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2Ol2/assets/hist.pdf.
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were $2.38 trillion. 5 1 Meanwhile, in 2010 the average state's revenue
(29.5% of which was made up of federal transfers, chief among them
being transfers for Medicaid) was $29.6 billion.'15 In other words, the
average state today has revenue (much of that revenue from the federal
government) that is about 1.2% as much as overall federal revenue and
about 0.8% of federal spending. Not counting federal transfers, state
revenues in 2010 were, on average, $20.72 billion per state, which was
about 0.9% of federal revenue and about 0.6% of federal spending.15 1
When the Court decided Bethlehem Steel in 1942, the federal
government argued that it had been coerced under duress by an entity
much smaller than itself.'. Today, states (that are, on average, roughly
1% the financial size of the federal government) insist, more plausibly,
that it is facially coercive for the federal government to threaten to
withhold 100% of Medicaid funding from any state that might dare stray
from the federal order to expand Medicaid radically. States are making
this claim because federal Medicaid funding is the single largest transfer
from the federal government to the states, and its disappearance could
well mean death for thousands of state citizens. If the federal government could seriously press the issue that it was being coerced by
Bethlehem Steel (which was threatening to cut off nothing from the
federal government other than Bethlehem Steel's possible future services
in building steel ships) in 1942,160 then the federal government in 2011
cannot reasonably claim that the judiciary is incapable of evaluating the
claims of these individual states that they have been threatened by the
federal government with a coercive scheme of all-in-or-all-out Medicaid
expansion.
The great, prescient Justice Benjamin Cardozo saw this sort of
potential lying latent in the arguments about the federal government of
his own day. Justice Cardozo clearly anticipated that the Court might
one day be forced to draw a line against federal coercion of the states,
even though he ruled with the Court that the questions of his day-for
instance, whether federal spending on state unemployment insurance
was coercive, and whether spending on social security was within the
general welfare-did not necessitate an articulation of those constitution-

156. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A NEW ERA OF
RESPONSIBILITY: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 114 (2009), available at http://www.gpo
access.gov/usbudget/fylO/pdf/fylO-newera.pdf.
157. See NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 2009 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT
92-95 (2010), available at http://www.nasbo.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=w7RqO7411Ew
%3d&tabid=38.
158. See id.
159. Bethlehem Steel, 315 U.S. at 294-95.
160. Id. at 295, 300-01.
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Justice Cardozo's own thoughtfully chosen words in both

Steward Machine Co. v. Davis161 and Helvering v. DaviS162 make plain

that Justice Cardozo, at least, felt that the line-drawing exercises, both
as to the idea of spending coercion and as to the related concept of the
"general" welfare, might someday be unavoidable.1 6 3
In Steward Machine, Justice Cardozo wrote about taxing and spending
for unemployment insurance as follows:
There must be a showing . .. that the tax and the credit in combination are weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of
the states.

. .

.

To draw the line intelligently between duress and

inducement, there is need to remind ourselves of facts.

...

Who then is coerced through the operation of this statute? Not the
taxpayer. He pays in fulfillment of the mandate of the local legislature. Not the state. Even now she does not offer a suggestion that in
passing the unemployment law she was affected by duress....
Nothing in the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue
influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be applied with
fitness to the relations between state and nation. Even on that
assumption the location of the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a question of
degree, at times, perhaps, of fact. The point had not been reached
when Alabama made her choice. We cannot say that she was acting,
not of her unfettered will, but under the strain of a persuasion
equivalent to undue influence, when she chose to have relief administered under laws of her own making, by agents of her own selection,
instead of under federal laws, administered by federal officers, with all
the ensuing evils, at least to many minds, of federal patronage and
power. There would be a strange irony, indeed, if her choice were now
to be annulled on the basis of an assumed duress in the enactment of
a statute which her courts have accepted as a true expression of her
will....
[I]nducement or persuasion does not go beyond the bounds of power.
We do not fix the outermost line. Enough for present purposes that
wherever the line may be, this statute is within it. Definition more
precise must abide the wisdom of the future."
On the same day that the Court decided Steward Machine, Justice
Cardozo, in Helvering, made parallel arguments in the context of a
general-welfare discussion concerning Social Security:

161. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
162. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
163.

See Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 586-91; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41.

164. Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 586-91.
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Congress may spend money in aid of the 'general welfare.' There
have been great statesmen in our history who have stood for other
views. We will not resurrect the contest. It is now settled by decision.
The conception of the spending power advocated by Hamilton and
strongly reinforced by Story has prevailed over that of Madison, which
has not been lacking in adherents. Yet difficulties are left when the
power is conceded. The line must still be drawn between one welfare
and another, between particular and general. Where this shall be
placed cannot be known through a formula in advance of the event.
There is a middle ground or certainly a penumbra in which discretion
is at large. The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The
discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. This is now
familiar law. 'When such a contention comes here we naturally require
a showing that by no reasonable possibility can the challenged
legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the
Congress.'

Justice Cardozo recognized that although line-drawing about coercive
spending-like line-drawing about the meaning of the general welfare in
spending-may be difficult to do in the abstract, those difficulties would
melt away in the presence of facts showing coercion or facts showing
that spending would be devoted to particular states' welfare instead of
the general welfare of all states. The failure of coercion to have factually
been shown in Steward Machine was clear to Justice Cardozo (writing
for the Court) specifically because neither Alabama nor any other state
was a party to the litigation, and all states appeared to enthusiastically
welcome the unemployment insurance funding.'
In the present-day

165. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936)).
166. StewardMach., 301 U.S. at 590. The Court in Steward Machine considered some
issues common to the present challenge to health care reform, but that case is distinguishable on a number of critical fronts. The Social Security Act's, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3 01-13 9 7 jj (2006
& Supp. III 2009), unemployment provisions, which were challenged by a private employer
in Steward Machine, merely "authorized an appropriation for aid to the states for the
administration of their [unemployment insurance] laws. No conditions of any great
moment had to be met to entitle a state law to recognition for tax-offset purposes, other
than that all of the unemployment compensation funds had to be actually used for
payments to unemployed workers." Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment
Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 32 (1945). As all states willingly and quickly accepted the
federal funds, there was no need for a citizen from a non-accepting State to apply directly
to the federal trust fund. The Court in Steward Machine, however, considered that
alternative prospect to have been viable, unlike here as to Medicaid participation, which
is all-or-nothing. Moreover, unlike here, no states in Steward Machine challenged the
unemployment spending law, which Justice Cardozo noted carefully in his decision for the
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Medicaid expansion, by contrast, there is "no reasonable possibility"6 7
that the general welfare could be advanced if the federal government
were to strip selected U.S. citizens of every dime of federal funding for
Medicaid simply because their financially desperate state disagreed with
the expansive nature of Medicaid reform.
The twenty-six state health care reform case is radically different by
the precise factual measure used by Justice Cardozo in Steward
Though twenty-six states are suing to stop Medicaid
Machine.'
those states supposedly having volunteered for the
despite
expansion,
according to the Obama Administration), not one
least
(at
expansion
out.
opted
has
state
Back in 1937, Justice Cardozo was willing to leave the question of
coercion to the "wisdom of the future."" 9 Seventy-four years later that
future has arrived. It falls on the successors to Justice Cardozo in the
judiciary to say that this exercise of national power has gone beyond the
line of a meaningfully discrete spending power.
In the Florida litigation, the Obama Administration seized on selective
parts of Justice Cardozo's statements cited above, in particular those
suggesting that the courts should generally defer to Congress on
spending and determinations of the general welfare.' 70 The Obama
Administration, however, over-reads those lines about presumptions and
squeezes them for much more. The Obama Administration would have
it that any and all questions about coercion and the general welfare are,
categorically, political questions immune from judicial review.
The federal government's retreat to the political question doctrine
seems like a dubious gambit given the more recent history of the Court
as to political questions. The political question doctrine has rarely been
followed by the Court in its modern era, beginning with Baker v.
Carr."' Despite a long prior history of repeatedly holding redistricting

5-4 majority:
Who then is coerced through the operation of this statute? . . . Not the state.
Even now she does not offer [suchl a suggestion. . . . We cannot say that she was
acting, not of her unfettered will, but under the strain of a persuasion equivalent
to undue influence, when she chose to have relief administered under laws of her
own making, by agents of her own selection, instead of under federal laws,
administered by federal officers....
In ruling as we do, we leave many questions open.
301 U.S. at 589-90.
167. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 67).
168.

See Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 589-90.

169. Id. at 591.
170. See Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 142,
at *38-39.
171. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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to be a political question, the Court, beginning in Baker, embarked on
a careful, evolving search for ever-more-perfect tests for redistricting-line-drawing in a rather literal sense.'72
Whether one believes that the Court should have applied the political
question doctrine in a case like Bush v. Gore,"' even a casual Supreme
Court observer can fairly note that the Court views its general role as
appropriately being able to enter even the most political of thickets,
especially in extreme situations in which the political process appears to
have broken down. After the notoriously fractured procedure leading to
the enactment of health care reform, together with the more particular
sense that the states were largely excluded from any meaningful
participation in deciding whether or how to expand Medicaid, it seems
unlikely that the political question doctrine will prove to be an independent bar to judicial consideration of the extent of the spending power.
This prediction may be especially credible at a time when the public
and the majority of states seem sour, bitter, and spitting about federal
spending that may have outstripped the nation's native ability to fund
that spending. In other words, it would not likely be seen by the public
as fundamentally illegitimate for the Court now to suggest that Congress
may finally have gone beyond its constitutional bounds in this latest
congressional paroxysm of entitlement spending, especially when
Congress relied in part on unwilling states to fund expansion of the
Medicaid entitlement and when those states under almost any predictive
scenario will have to make painful cuts in other areas to accommodate
Medicaid's expansion. This is far afield from the rushed, partisan
backdrop to Bush. Here, in the context of health care reform, the public
would more likely applaud the Court for attempting to fulfill its intended
role of deliberately reminding the political branches that the Constitution is not a license to obliterate the autonomy of the states through
creative-more accurately, destructive-use of the spending power.
The careful, knowledgeable Professor Gillian Metzger makes good, safe
points about legal precedent and has already predicted well in this
emerging constitutional controversy. What she has not done quite as
well is make room for the broader sweep of history that is now unfolding
in the American constitutional firmament. Meanwhile, a seemingly
manic and manipulative national government has gone past its own
political and financial abilities to tax and spend, resorting to pressing
the states to fund and follow the federal bidding against the wills of a
majority of those states.

172.

Id. at 210-11.

173.

531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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True, the states' Spending Clause argument is a sobering one-something unprecedented in the case law and something that will shift
congressional practice going forward if the states' view is credited. For
all its novelty though, the states' argument has deep roots, not only in
specific words like "provide for," "general welfare," "[clommerce," and
"necessary and proper,"1 74 -chosen so carefully by the brilliant framers
in that hot summer of 1787-but also in the subtle, eloquent predictions
of the judiciary's later luminaries like Justice Cardozo.
Contrary to its own assertions and practice, even the modern Congress
does not have a blank check, payable to anyone for anything Congress
might crave. Congress cannot constitutionally crowd out the autonomy
and potential alternative visions of the states. The framers imagined
(and the ratifiers likely expected) that they were imposing real, practical
limits on federal spending. They all deeply respected the potential of
states to add to the national experiment without being bullied into
bankruptcy or pauper-hood by a central authority like King George-or
Queen Fed-Med.
This case tests the federal spending limits. The states can and will
win this challenge in the end, but only if judges and justices like
Benjamin Cardozo rise to fulfill their roles in helping the nation think
through and resolve one of the most central constitutional challenges of
our own time.
(continuedon next page)

174.

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 18.

